The desire for Taiwanese independence has experienced a significant drop over the past three years, with only 25.3% of people who want to “move toward independence” or seeking “independence as soon as possible” - down from nearly one-third - 32.4% - in 2020.
So, of the (apparently) 7.4% who do want unification (either right away or after waiting some unspecified period), what percentage of that 7.4% mean unification under PRC and how many unification under ROC rule?
The graph also shows that (since 1994) those two groups that want unification (whether now or later) have fallen from 20% to the current 7.4%.
The number who want independence at some later date has almost tripled since 1994 (8.0% ti 21.9%), whereas the number who want independence immediately or a.s.a.p. is very small and has barely changed (3.1% to 4.4%).
It suggests to me that whatever else most Taiwanese want they do not want conflict or violence with mainland China.
It certainly doesn’t suggest that any significant percentage of Taiwanese want reunification with the PRC today. Anybody have any insights into the nitty gritty details of the 30 years of polling or whether or not we should be suspicious of the Election Study Center at NCCU?
The desire for Taiwanese independence has experienced a significant drop over the past three years, with only 25.3% of people who want to “move toward independence” or seeking “independence as soon as possible” - down from nearly one-third - 32.4% - in 2020.
https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963
So, of the (apparently) 7.4% who do want unification (either right away or after waiting some unspecified period), what percentage of that 7.4% mean unification under PRC and how many unification under ROC rule?
The graph also shows that (since 1994) those two groups that want unification (whether now or later) have fallen from 20% to the current 7.4%.
The number who want independence at some later date has almost tripled since 1994 (8.0% ti 21.9%), whereas the number who want independence immediately or a.s.a.p. is very small and has barely changed (3.1% to 4.4%).
It suggests to me that whatever else most Taiwanese want they do not want conflict or violence with mainland China.
It certainly doesn’t suggest that any significant percentage of Taiwanese want reunification with the PRC today. Anybody have any insights into the nitty gritty details of the 30 years of polling or whether or not we should be suspicious of the Election Study Center at NCCU?
Ahhh now this is exactly the kind of data i was looking for. Thanks yogthos
O7
🫡